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JUSTICE WHITE'S PRINCIPLED PASSION FOR
CONSISTENCY
J. Thomas Sullivan*
The death of Justice Byron White represents another step
toward the end of an era that most of us in midlife as attorneys
associate with the Presidency of John Kennedy and the Supreme
Court of Chief Justice Earl Warren.' President Kennedy's
appointment of Justice White to the Court hardly ensured a
liberal bent in its rulings; indeed, Justice White clearly proved to
be a conservative 2 and moderating influence in a number of
* Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little
Rock. I appreciate the suggestions of Lindsey Gustafson of the UALR faculty and The
Journal's editorial board, the editorial assistance of UALR law graduate Amy Dunn, and
the substantive insights of Rod Smith, Herff Professor of Law at the University of
Memphis. Professor Smith observes that Justice White's opinions on matters relating to the
First Amendment, particularly in religion and defamation cases, demonstrate less
commitment to precedent and doctrinal finality than my analysis with respect primarily to
his position in criminal cases suggests. On this point, I defer to his expertise; my
experience in criminal appeals has perhaps skewed my view of Justice White as a rather
uncompromising "law and order" judge who nevertheless understood the need for
aggressive advocacy.
1. At the time of his death, Justice White was the last remaining justice who had
served on the Warren Court.
2. For example, Justice White's position on the death penalty was demonstrably
conservative. His concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310, 312-13
(1972), reflected a belief that uniform application of the penalty would solve the problem
of its arbitrary or capricious infliction. His position undoubtedly encouraged drafters of
post-Furman state capital punishment sentencing systems who sought to meet his
objections to the infrequent application of the penalty with mandatory capital punishment
statutes. These were subsequently rejected by the Court in Woodson v. North Carolina,428
U.S. 280, 306-07 (1976), Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 358-63 (1976), Roberts v.
Louisiana,431 U.S. 633, 637, n. 5 (1977) (per curiam), and Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S.
66, 85 (1987). In each case, Justice White dissented. Yet, writing the lead opinion reversing
the conviction and sentence of death, he declined to join a numerical majority of the Court
in Arizona v. Fulminante,499 U.S. 279, 288-95 (1991), which overruled the Court's longstanding rule that admission of a coerced confession can never be deemed harmless error.
See Payne v. Ark., 356 U.S. 560, 561 (1958). Instead, Justice White, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, argued for adherence to the "consistent line of authority
that has recognized as a basic tenet of our criminal justice system ...the prohibition
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areas.' Nevertheless, he demonstrated a strain of judicial
independence and dedication to principle that encourages us, as
lawyers, to believe that all presidential appointments to the High
Court have the potential for faithful service to a vision of the
Constitution that is not imbedded in extreme political ideology
or blindness to the virtues of reasoned argument.4
Justice White's most interesting contribution to the work of
the Court may well have been reflected in his concern that the
Justices exercise their jurisdiction to ensure a uniform
application of the law. As attorneys, our ability to serve the
against using a defendant's coerced confession against him at his criminal trial."
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 295 (emphasis added).
3. Although conservative in approach, he often demonstrated a streak of
individualism, perhaps reflecting his heritage in the West, that recognized the need to
protect the rights of the individual when confronted by the power of the State. For example,
in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), he wrote the majority opinion for the Court holding
that students facing temporary suspension from public school were entitled to notice of the
charges against them and a fair opportunity to answer. Id. at 581-82. His vote was critical
to the 5-4 majority on an issue on which a more ideologically conservative judge could
have readily subscribed to the dissent's position that federal due process did not
contemplate recognition of procedural rights for students in such settings. See id. at 584,
595-96 (Powell, J., dissenting).
4. Although Justice White is typically regarded as a conservative on criminal
procedure issues, his description of the duties of the criminal defense lawyer as advocate in
United States v. Wade could hardly be more impassioned:
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty and to make
sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be dedicated to making the
criminal trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the
commission of the crime. To this extent, our so-called adversary system is not
adversary at all; nor should it be. But defense counsel has no such comparable
obligation to ascertainor present the truth. Our system assigns him a different
mission. He must be and is interested in preventing the conviction of the
innocent, but, absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his
client whether he is innocent or guilty. The State has the obligation to present the
evidence. Defense counsel need present nothing, even if he knows what the truth
is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any confidences of
his client, or furnish any other information to help the prosecution's case. If he
can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a
disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our interest
in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State to its proof to put
the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or
knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly, there are some limits which defense counsel
must observe but more often than not, defense counsel will cross-examine a
prosecution witness and impeach him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is
telling the truth, just as he will attempt to destroy a witness who he thinks is
lying. In this respect, as part of our modified adversary system and as part of the
duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require
conduct which in many instances has little, if any relation to the search for truth.
388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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interests of our clients requires that we be able to accurately
assess the current state of the law and identify trends that may
have implications for those clients' peculiar concerns. This is
best done when the law is stable, or at the least, progressing on a
stable course in an identifiable direction. Uncertainty in
doctrine, while undoubtedly of interest to academics and
theoreticians, is an anathema to the practitioner whose sound
counsel is dependent upon the stability that doctrinal certainty
affords.
In case after case presented to the Court for review, Justice
White's passion for resolution of conflict is apparent not only in
his opinion writing,' but in his dissents from the denial of the
writ of certiorari. There, recognizing the existence of significant
conflict in the approach taken to important constitutional
questions by differing lower courts,6 he argued that the Court
5. Justice White wrote a number of majority and plurality opinions in which the Court
granted certiorari to reconcile circuit splits. E.g. S.W. Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81,
85 (1991) (resolving conflict over application of Jones Act and Longshoreman and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act as remedy for rigging foreman injured while working on
floating platform); U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 606 (1989) (construing RICO statute to
authorize freezing of defendant's assets by pretrial order, even when defendant intends to
use assets to pay counsel's fee for representation); Landers v. Natl. R.R. PassengersCorp.,
485 U.S. 652, 654 (1988) (holding that employee not entitled to have union of choice
represent him at company-level grievance and disciplinary proceedings); Traynor v.
Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 541 (1988) (holding judicial review of Veterans' Administration
decisions not foreclosed on challenges brought pursuant to Rehabilitation Act); CharlesD.
Bonnano Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 405-06 (1982) (upholding NLRB
finding that unilateral withdrawal of employer from multi-employer bargaining unit due to
bargaining impasse constitutes unfair labor practice when withdrawing employer later
refuses to execute collective bargaining agreement executed by unit and multi-employer
association); EPA v. Natl. Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U.S. 64, 69 (1980) (assessing
availability of variance for plants performing at maximum use of technology within
economic capability to eliminate discharge of pollutants); Ill. Brick Co. v. Ill.,
431 U.S.
720, 728 (1977) (holding that "pass-on" rule applicable in antitrust actions must be applied
equally to plaintiffs and defendants); Cass v. U.S., 417 U.S. 72, 74 (1974) (resolving
conflict between Ninth Circuit and Court of Claims over application of "rounding clause"
to computation of readjustment benefits for involuntarily released reserve officers); U.S. v.
Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 568 (1974) (holding suppression of wiretap evidence not required
based on misidentification of Assistant Attorney General as official authorizing wiretap);
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 221-22 (1963) (upholding agency
determination that super-seniority awarded to strike replacements constitutes an unfair
labor practice ).
6. The Court's rules indicate the significance it attaches to reconciling splits in lower
courts on matters of interpretation of the Constitution or federal law. Its Rule 10(a)
recognizes certiorari as appropriate to resolve conflicts among the federal circuits, while

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

should exercise its jurisdiction to resolve or harmonize these
divergent approaches. In dissenting from the denial of certiorari
in Bailey v. Weinberger,7 he argued:
It is a prime function of this Court's certiorari jurisdiction
to resolve precisely the kind of conflict here presented.
Perhaps the state of our docket will not permit us to resolve
all disagreements between courts of appeals, or between
federal and state courts, and perhaps we must tolerate the
fact that in some instances enforcement of federal law in
one area of the country differs from enforcement in
another. Hopefully, these situations will be few and far
between.'
The value of these published dissents lies both in Justice
White's unwavering commitment to resolution of conflict in
constitutional doctrine, 9 but perhaps more significantly for the
practitioner, in his identification of doctrinal variation
warranting further development and litigation in the Court. 0
For example, in Spierings v. Alaska," the petitioner brought
a still-unresolved issue of double jeopardy to the Court,
questioning whether the Alaska courts had properly held that a
jury deliberating on the greater offense could be precluded from
considering the lesser-included offense unless it had
unanimously agreed to acquit on the greater charge.' 2 The
subsection (b) recognizes the certworthiness of conflicts between state courts of last resort
or state appellate and federal circuit courts. Sup. Ct. R. 10 (1999).
7. 419 U.S. 953 (1974) (mem.) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
8. Id. at 953-54 (citation omitted).
9. One commentator has noted: "The retirement of Justice Byron White from the
United States Supreme Court removed the 'resident nag' who, in dissents from denials of
certiorari, regularly reminded his colleagues of the intercircuit conflict cases the Court had
refused to review." Stephen Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63
Mont. L. Rev. 119, 127 (2002).
10. However, at least one study suggests that Justice White overstated the significance
of perceived conflicts, arguing that his emphasis on resolution was not necessarily wellgrounded in light of the precise issues presented in the petitions for certiorari reviewed for
a single term of the Court. See Michael J. Broyde, Student Author, The Intercircuit
Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An Analysis of Justice White's Dissentsfrom Denial of
CertiorariDuring the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 610 (1987).
I1. 479 U.S. 1021 (1986) (mem.).
12. Typically, in a criminal trial the accused is entitled to a lesser-included-offense
instruction when there is an evidentiary basis for a jury to acquit on the charged offense
and convict on the lesser offense. This situation often arises in the context of murder
prosecutions when lesser degrees of murder or manslaughter may be appropriate as
grounds for conviction. For instance, the evidence may show that the accused did not act
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defense had requested an instruction permitting the jury to reach
the issue of the lesser-included offense in the event jurors were
deadlocked on the greater charge. The trial court rejected the
proposed instruction and was upheld by the Alaska Court of
Appeals 3 and a majority of the Alaska Supreme Court.' 4 But a
dissent in the state supreme court" argued for the alternative
instruction proposed by the defense, raising the specter of
conflicting approaches taken by other jurisdictions, including the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.'7
Justice White perceived the significance of the conflicting
approaches taken in the lower courts and dissented from the
Court's denial of certiorari. For the criminal defense lawyer, his
dissent provides an important observation on the potential
constitutional nature of this question. If juries must reach
unanimous conclusions of acquittal on greater offenses before
considering the suitability of conviction on a lesser-included
offense, then the pressures on a lone holdout to change her vote
in order to ensure a verdict are substantial. Alternatively, the
holdout or holdouts who force mistrial compromise the
important right of the defendant to have the impaneled jury
reach a verdict, even on a lesser charge, thus avoiding the
prospect of another trial. Yet, as the Alaska appellate court
noted, the freedom of the jury to compromise on the lesser
without first acquitting on the charged offense necessarily means
with a particular degree of criminal intent, or that the killing resulted from a reckless, rather

than intentional act, or as the result of an extreme emotional disturbance or "heat of
passion." Defense lawyers and prosecutors often use lesser-included offense practice for

tactical advantage in offering jurors a basis for compromising in the event they are unable
to arrive at conclusions on conviction or acquittal. The doctrine of lesser-included offenses
initially developed to assist the prosecution in securing conviction when its proof of a
greater offense failed on an element of the charged offense. Keeble v. U.S., 412 U.S. 205,

208 (1973).
13. Dresnek v. State, 697 P.2d 1059 (Alaska App. 1986).
14. Dresnek v. State, 718 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1986).

15. Id. at 157 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
16. The dissent was concerned that the requirement for unanimity of acquittal would

require a juror having a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt on the greater charge, but
willing to convict on the lesser-included offense, to face the prospect of forcing a mistrial
in the event he persisted in refusing to convict. This, according to the dissent, constituted
an unfair pressure on the holdout juror to abandon principle and vote to convict on the
greater charge in order to ensure a unanimous verdict. Id. at 158
17. U.S. v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984) (following U.S. v. Tsanas, 572
F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1978)).
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that the State will suffer some convictions on lesser offenses
when mistrial might have eventually resulted in conviction on
the charged offense. 8
Justice White expressed no conclusion on the merits of the
question presented in his dissent, although this is not always the
practice of justices offering dissenting opinions from the denial
of certiorari." Rather, it is apparent that his position was not
outcome driven, but reflected a preference for resolution of
conflicts in interpretation and doctrine. Resolution promotes
stability in the interpretation and application of constitutional
doctrine, regardless of the ultimate decision reached by a
majority of the Court.
Occasionally, Justice White expressed his ultimate opinion
in his dissent from
• 20 the denial of the writ. For example, in
Blakley v. Florida, he argued that the petition demonstrated a
conflict deserving of review-this time between a decision
rendered by a state appellate court and a prior decision of the
Supreme Court." He also observed that the conflict was
"sufficiently clear to... warrant summary reversal of

18. Dresnek, 697 P.2d at 1062 n. 7.
19. For example, Justice Stevens criticized Justice White's development of factual and
legal argument in his dissent from denial of certiorari in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Sheffield,
471 U.S. 1140 (1985) (mem.). Justice Stevens observed:
Reasonable Justices can certainly differ on whether certiorari should be granted
in this case. Justice White, in dissent, has explained why he favors a grant of the
petition for writ of certiorari. There is, of course, no reason why that dissent
should identify the reasons supporting a denial of the petition. Matters such as
the fact that apparently only one 26-year-old vessel may be affected by the Ninth
Circuit's ruling, that apparently no other State has enacted a deballasting
prohibition similar to Alaska's, and that that Coast Guard retains the power to
modify its regulations relating to deballasting lend support to the Court's
discretionary determination that review in this Court is not necessary even if the
Court of Appeals' decision is arguably incorrect. I add these few words only
because of my concern that unanswered dissents from denial of certiorari
sometimes lead the uninformed reader to conclude that the Court is not
managing its discretionary docket in a responsible manner.
Id. at 1140,
20. 444 U.S. 904, 904 (1979) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
21. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (holding that defendant's postMiranda silence cannot be used to impeach his trial testimony because admission of silence
in this circumstance would effectively punish him for the exercise of his right to remain
silent).
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petitioner's conviction." 22 At other times, he was content to
simply identify the conflict.23
The single thread underlying Justice White's view of the
Court's duty to resolve conflicts may well reflect the same
values prompting his support for mandatory capital sentencing
schemes, his unyielding perception that fairness demands a
uniform application of law. 24 For example, when confronted with
a cert petition arguing conflicting circuit views on admissibility
of exculpatory polygraph evidence in criminal trials, 5 he noted
the conflict among circuits16 in addressing the exclusion of this
evidence by the Fifth Circuit in the petitioner's case 27 and
concluded: "This Court should grant certiorari in such cases as
this, where a defendant's rights would be notably different
depending upon the Circuit in which he is tried, and where the
record affords a clear opportunity to address the question in
conflict., 28 Again, his dissent highlighted an issue that would
lead to further litigation, eventually surfacing in United States v.
Scheffer, 9 where the Court rejected the argument that the Sixth
Amendment required admission of exculpatory polygraph
evidence in criminal trials.3°
Justice White's concern for fairness in the application of
the law was not limited to criminal cases, as his dissents from
denial of certiorari demonstrate. In Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co.
22. Blakley, 444 U.S. at 905.
23. E.g. C. Liquor Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 1022 (1980) (mem.) (White, J., dissenting);
Control Data Corp. v. Potter Instrument Co., 449 U.S. 1022 (1980) (mem.) (White, J.,
dissenting) (both dissents identifying cases in which Justice White concluded that a conflict
existed justifying the grant of certiorari). And in Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v.
Atlas Corp., 445 U.S. 911 (1980), his dissent expressly notes the conflict and his prior
dissent from denial of certiorari, perhaps indicating his irritation that a prior opportunity to
resolve the conflict had been lost.
24. See supra n. 2.
25. Masri v. U.S., 434 U.S. 907 (1977).
26. The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits all recognized the trial court's
decision to admit polygraph evidence in the exercise of its sound discretion. Id. at 908.
27. Masri v. U.S., 547 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1977).

28. Masri, 434 U.S. at 908.
29. 523 U.S. 303 (1998). Justice White was no longer on the Court when Scheffer was

decided.
30. Id. at 317. Ironically, by the time the Court considered admissibility of polygraph
evidence in Scheffer, the Fifth Circuit had joined other circuits in holding that polygraph
evidence could be admitted at trial in the discretion of the trial court, at least in certain
limited circumstances. U.S. v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995).
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v. Mountain State Construction Co.,3 his dissent fully explained

his concern for resolution of conflicting decisions. The issue
presented involved a question of the exercise of personal
jurisdiction based on the sufficiency of minimum contacts of a
non-resident defendant with the forum state. Justice White noted
that the Seventh Circuit itself had pointed out a significant

conflict in approaches taken to this fundamental issue of the
exercise of jurisdiction.32 He argued that the Court should grant
the writ and resolve the conflict because:
The question at issue is one of considerable importance to
contractual dealings between purchasers and sellers located
in different States. The disarray among federal and state
courts noted above may well have a disruptive effect on
commercial relations in which certainty of result is a prime
objective. That disarray also strongly suggests that prior
decisions of this Court offer no clear guidance on the
question. I would grant the petition in order to address this
important problem.
Typically, Justice White expressed no opinion as to the

proper resolution of the conflict. Rather, it was the existence of a
conflict potentially disrupting commerce that drew his attention.
The need for certainty required resolution of the conflict so that

businesses could understand the rules under which they would
be operating.3 4 It may be that the actual resolution was, in his
eyes, less critical than that there be resolution.

The death of any Supreme Court justice, particularly one
whose service covered decades, prompts reflection on the

31. 445 U.S. 907 (1980) (mem.) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
32. Id. at 909 (citing Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mt. St. Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596
(7th Cir. 1980)) (" [T]he question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate
defendant based on contractual dealings has deeply divided the federal and state courts.").
33. Idat910-11.
34. In this sense, Justice White's penchant for consistency is itself demonstrated to be
consistent. His preference for resolution of conflicts was not dependent on the character of
cases, whether criminal or civil, or on the rights of businesses or individuals. See Hanson v.
Cir. Ct. of the First Jud. Cir. of Ill., 444 U.S. 907 (1979) (White, J. dissenting from denial
of certiorari). "It is apparent that some federal courts would have entertained petitioner's
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.. .while another, like the court below, would not." Id. at 907
(citations omitted).
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justice's scholarship, demeanor, public persona, and more
intimately, personal values.35

Justice White served on the Court during one of the most
creative, yet tumultuous, periods in its history. During his

tenure, which coincided with both a dramatic expansion of
judicial power and a growing recognition of its limits in the
shaping of our collective values, the Court extended its reach far
beyond exposition of legal doctrine into a re-examination of the
political, social and moral fabric of our society. History's great
gift to Byron White was placing him at the center during this era
of growing judicial influence on American life.

35. See e.g. Dennis Hutchinson, BiographerReflects on "Whizzer White "(available at
< http://www.law.com/cgi-bingx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=law/View&c
=Article&cid=ZZZSVJRZ60D&live=true&cst=l&pc=O&pa=O>) (accessed June 7, 2002;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). Hutchinson is the author of
The Man Who Once was Whizzer White: A Portraitof Justice Byron R. White (Free Press
1998).

